Abstract-We develop a couple of new methods to reduce transmission overheads in broadcast encryption. The methods are based on the idea of assigning one key per each partition using one-way key chains after partitioning the users. One method adopts skipping chains on partitions containing up to p revoked users and the other adopts cascade chains on partitions with layer structure. The scheme using the former has the transmission overhead r p+1 + N0r c , which is less than r=p if r > p 2 N=c. The scheme using the latter keeps the same transmission overhead with the Subset Difference (SD) scheme when r approaches 0, where r is the number of revoked users. Combining the two schemes, we propose a new broadcast encryption scheme whose transmission overhead is the same with that of the SD scheme for small r and becomes smaller than that of the SD as r grows. The scheme using skipping chains possesses an advantage that any number of new users can join any time at no cost for current users. Finally, we show that the proposed key assignment scheme satisfies key-indistinguishability assuming pseudorandom generators.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
ROADCAST encryption(BE) is a cryptographic method for a center to broadcast digital contents efficiently to a large number of users so that only nonrevoked users can decrypt the contents. BE has a wide range of applications such as the internet or mobile broadcast of movies, news or games, pay TV, CD, and DVD, to name a few.
In broadcast encryption, the center distributes to each user the set of keys, called the user-key of , in the setup stage. We assume that the user-keys are not updated afterwards, that is, user-keys are stateless. A session is a time interval during which only one encrypted message (digital contents) is broadcasted. The session-key, say , is the key used to encrypt the message of the session. In order to broadcast a message , the center encrypts using the session-key and broadcasts the encrypted message together with a header, which contains encryptions of and the information for nonrevoked users to decrypt . In other words, the center broadcasts header where is any preset symmetric encryption algorithm. Then, every nonrevoked user computes header and with this decrypts , where is a predefined algorithm. For any revoked user , however, header should not render . Furthermore, there should be no polynomial time algorithm that outputs even with all the revoked user-keys and the header as input.
The header size, the computing time of and the size of are called the transmission overhead (TO), the computation cost (CC), and the storage size (SS), respectively. One of the main issues of broadcast encryption is to minimize the transmission overhead with practical computation cost and storage size.
The notion of broadcast encryption was first introduced by Berkovits [1] in 1991 using polynomial interpolation and vector based secret sharing. Fiat and Naor [3] in 1993 suggested a formal definition of broadcast encryption and proposed a systematic method of broadcast encryption. The polynomial interpolation method was improved by Naor and Pinkas [12] in 2000 to allow multiple usage and by the authors [13] in 2004 to allow a large number of users. The first broadcast encryption scheme that achieved transmission overhead was proposed in 2001 by Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech [10] , called the Subset Difference (SD) method. This was improved by Halevi and Shamir [5] in 2002 by adopting the notion of layers and thereby their scheme is called the Layered Subset Difference (LSD) method. Both SD and LSD are based on tree structures and they have been the best known broadcast schemes up to now. To be more precise, let be the total number of users and be the number of revoked users. The SD scheme requires transmission overhead and storage size for each user. The computation cost is only computations of one-way permutations. The LSD scheme reduces the storage size to while keeping the computation cost same. But the transmission overhead increases to in LSD. For other interesting recent articles on broadcast encryption, we refer the readers [2] , [4] .
In this paper, we develop a couple of methods to reduce transmission overhead in broadcast encryption based on the idea of 0018-9448/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE one key per each partition using one-way key chains after partitioning the users. More precisely, we put all users on a straight line and partition the line into intervals to each of which the center assigns just one key. The key can be derived by only those nonrevoked users in the interval and will be used in decrypting the session-key.
The first method adopts skipping chains on partitions containing up to revoked users. It has been a general belief that at least one key per each revoked user should be included in the overhead and hence seems to be the lower bound of the transmission overhead in any broadcast encryption scheme with reasonable computation cost and storage size.
In the scheme using skipping chains, however, the transmission overhead is about , where is a predetermined constant. TO becomes less than if and , which breaks the barrier of for the first time under our knowledge. For example, if we take and , then and . We remark that TO can be greater than if in which case SD has smaller TO. The computation cost is very cheap with only computations of a pseudorandom sequence generator. The storage size is . Our scheme is very flexible with two parameters and . If a user device allows a large key storage like set-top boxes and DVD players, then we may take and as large as possible to reduce the transmission overhead. If a user device has limited storage and computing power like smart cards and sensors, then we may set and as small as possible. Another advantage of this scheme is that any number of new users can join any time easily. In order to add new users to the system, the center just places them at the end of the line, computes and sends the corresponding user-keys to them. This process requires neither interaction nor refreshment of current user-keys. (See [7] and [6] for the broadcast encryption scheme , which is the previous version of the skipping chain scheme.)
When is very small, the skipping chain scheme larger TO than that of the SD scheme. This is an intrinsic attribute of linear structures. As a complement, we adopt a concept of tree to a linear structure to introduce layer structure and cascade chains on it. In cascade chain schemes, we assign a key to each interval which starts from or ends at some special node so that every interval between two revoked users can be covered by at most two keys. This enables us to have as the transmission overhead for very small , which is comparable to the SD scheme. If grows, however, this scheme has smaller TO than the SD scheme. That is, if , the transmission overhead of the cascade chain scheme is about , which is smaller than that of the SD scheme for . Cascade structure also enables us to reduce the size of a user-key so that the storage size of the scheme is comparable to most practical schemes. Without cascade structure, the storage size could increase exponentially as we introduce layers and special nodes.
Combining the two schemes, we propose a new broadcast encryption scheme with very small transmission overhead for all . The transmission overhead of the combined chain scheme is the same as those of the cascade chain scheme and the SD scheme as approaches to 0, the same as that of the skipping chain scheme as grows bigger, and even better for some values of in between. User addition, however, is not available because of left cascade key chains in the combined chain scheme as well as in the cascade chain scheme. But if we use only right cascade key chains, then user addition without updating the user-keys of current users is still feasible in both schemes.
The notion of the revocation-scheme security was introduced in [11] . It captures the concept of semantic security against chosen message attacks in broadcast encryption. In the subset-cover framework, it was proved that a broadcast encryption scheme satisfies the revocation-scheme security if its key-assignment scheme satisfies key-indistinguishability and the underlying encryption function is secure [11] . We show that our key assignment schemes satisfy key-indistinguishability.
Roughly speaking, the revocation-scheme security assumes that any adversary, who may pool the secret information of a set of users (corrupted users), may have some influence on the choice of messages encrypted in the scheme, and may create bogus messages and see how nonrevoked users react, can not learn any information about the message This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the basic chain scheme. In Sections III and IV, we develop the skipping chain scheme and the cascade chain scheme, respectively. We combine the two schemes in Section V. Security proof of our schemes is given in Section VI. We compare our schemes with SD and LSD and discuss some practical issues in Section VII, and then briefly summarize our results in Section VIII.
II. LINEAR STRUCTURE
In this section, we introduce the basic chain scheme, where users are regarded as dots lined up in order. Although this scheme cuts the transmission overhead down to , the scheme requires a large storage for each user. The basic chain scheme, however, is the building ground for our skipping chain scheme and cascade chain scheme. We also introduce a variant of the basic chain scheme, called the -basic chain scheme, which improves the storage size at the cost of transmission overhead for small .
A. Framework
We adopt the subset-cover framework of [11] . Let be a straight line with dots (users) on it, where is the number of total users. In our schemes, each user is indexed by an integer and he/she is represented by the th dot, denoted by , in the line . The center first assigns the user-key to each user . Consider as the set of users and define to be the set of all subsets of satisfying certain conditions of the scheme under discussion. The center assigns each subset a key , called the subset-key of the subset that can be derived by each nonrevoked user of using his/her user-key. For each session, the center finds the disjoint subsets in , whose union covers all nonrevoked users, under a predetermined rule, keeping as small as possible. And then the center encrypts the session-key with the subset-key of for each . These encryptions of together with information on 's form the header. The number is usually defined to be the transmission overhead.
1) Encryption:
In each session, the center finds disjoint subsets in , whose union is the set of all nonrevoked users, and their subset-keys . The center then encrypts the session-key with for each , respectively, and a message with , and then broadcasts info info info where info is the information of the subset and and are preset symmetric encryption algorithms.
2) Decryption: Receiving the encrypted message info info info each nonrevoked user first finds the subset where he/she belongs and its subset-key . With this, computes and in order, where and are the decryption algorithm corresponding to and .
3) Security:
The notion of the revocation-scheme security introduced in [11] captures the concept of semantic security against chosen message attacks in broadcast encryption. Roughly speaking, the revocation-scheme security assumes that any adversary, who may pool the secret information of a set of users (corrupted users), may have some influence on the choice of messages encrypted in the scheme, and may create bogus messages and see how nonrevoked users react, can not learn any information about the message from the broadcasted message info info info if all the corrupted users are revoked. For more details, refer to [11, Sec. 6] . Moreover, it was proved that a scheme in the subset-cover framework satisfies revocation-scheme security if is a pseudorandom permutation (block-ciphers in practice), is a pseudorandom generators (stream-ciphers in practice), and the key assignment algorithm satisfies the key-indistinguishability, which is the property that for every subset its subset-key is indistinguishable from a random key given all the information of all users not in . We will show that our key assignment algorithms satisfy the key-indistinguishability in Section VI.
4) Performance:
In this framework, the TO is the header size and the SS is the maximum size of . We count only the number of encryptions for TO, since the information on the subset identifier can be encoded by much less bits than the encryptions. Since the subset key can be computed by applying a pseudorandom sequence generators (PRG) repeatedly, the CC counts the number of applications of PRG's.
B. Basic Chain Scheme
Let denote the users, where is the total number of users, and let be the number of revoked ones. We denote the interval starting from and ending at by . In the basic chain scheme, is the set of all these 's for , satisfying . For each interval , we assign the interval-key that will be used to encrypt and decrypt the session-key for the users in . Then the number of user-keys for each user is for and hence the average number of user-keys per user is , which is too big. We introduce key chains using one-way permutation to reduce the user-key size.
1) Key Assignment: In order to reduce the size of each userkey, we give some relations among the interval-keys. Let be a pseudorandom sequence generator such that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish the output of on a randomly chosen seed from a truly random string. We will denote by and the right and the left half of for any , respectively. Choose keys , randomly. Construct a key chain from each as follows:
We assign the user-key to for each . Note that the interval-key can only be computed by 's for and that it is not possible for other users to compute even if they all collude.
2) Encryption: For each session, the center marks the revoked users on the line and removes the marked users from the line to obtain disjoint intervals, say consisting of nonrevoked users as illustrated in Fig. 1 , whose union covers all nonrevoked users. Then the center broadcasts:
3) Decryption: Receiving the encrypted message, each nonrevoked user first locates the interval where he/she belongs, that is, finds , such that , and computes from the key he/she owns. And then decrypts and to obtain the session-key and the message , respectively, in order. Note that a revoked user cannot compute the session-key since he/she does not belong to any interval listed in the header (see ). 4) Performance: When users are revoked in the basic chain scheme, the maximum possible number of disjoint intervals in to cover all nonrevoked users is . So, the transmission overhead is Each user needs to keep user-keys. So, the storage size for each user is in the average and in the worst case. Note that the center needs to keep only keys Finally, the computation cost is at most computations of or , i.e.
Remark:
One may consider a circular structure by gluing two ends of the line and providing more key chains traversing the two ends. In a circular structure, TO is reduced by 1 and every member has the same size of user-key, , but it is not easy to add new users to the structure later.
C. -Basic Chain Scheme
Although the basic chain scheme reduces the transmission overhead down to , the storage size of each user is still too big to be practical. We can reduce the storage size by bounding the interval length, i.e., the number of users in the interval.
Let be a predetermined positive integer. Let -be the set of all intervals of the form satisfying , where is the length of . We call such intervals -intervals. 1) Key Assignment: Key generation of the -basic chain scheme is exactly same as that of the basic chain scheme except the maximal length of key chains is , i.e., the center constructs the key chain for each and for each , and then assigns the user-key if otherwise to for each . . In other words, the center partitions into subintervals of length starting from and the st subinterval consisting of the remaining users if any. This process is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Once the center obtains the -intervals -whose union covers all nonrevoked users, encryption and decryption are identical with those of the basic chain scheme. Those who are not belong to any -interval are the revoked ones and they can never access to the session-key (see Section II-A4).
3) Performance:
In the -basic scheme, each user needs to keep at most keys and hence -Note that it is still enough for the center to keep only keys where is the total number of users. The computation cost amounts to computations of or , i.e.
Finally, the transmission overhead in the -basic chain scheme can be computed rather easily as follows. provided that the revoked ratio is bigger than 0.01. The -basic chain scheme, however, has bigger TO than SD when is very small. Even if there is no revoked user, the TO of this scheme is while that of SD is just .
III. SKIPPING CHAIN AND PUNCTURED INTERVALS
In this section, we propose the skipping chain scheme that reduces the transmission overhead further down by introducing skipping chains on punctured intervals. For example, using skipping chains on -punctured intervals, we can achieve transmission overhead less than if , where is a positive integer. The skipping chain scheme is based on the -basic chain scheme. In order to make the number of disjoint intervals , whose union covers all nonrevoked users, as small as possible, we have to enlarge -. This is the main reason for introducing the notion of punctured intervals and skipping chains on them.
A. Punctured Intervals
Let , and be positive integers, where is also an integer, and fix them. Here, is the constant introduced in the -basic chain scheme. By a -punctured -interval we mean a subset of or less consecutive users starting from and ending at nonrevoked users and containing or less revoked users. Let -be the set of all -punctured -intervals. Define ---
In each session, the disjoint intervals in -, which covers all nonrevoked users, are determined under the following rule:
• The first interval starts from the leftmost nonrevoked user.
• Each interval starts and ends with nonrevoked users.
• An interval with no revoked user may contain as many as users.
• An interval with at least one revoked user may contain at most users including up to revoked ones. • Each interval contains the maximal possible number of users possibly including revoked ones. Fig. 3 
B. Skipping Chain Scheme
In this section, we propose the skipping chain scheme with parameters , and (an improved version of -scheme [7] ) for broadcast encryption, which is denoted by -. In the skipping chain scheme, we assign only one key to each interval in -, which can be derived exclusively by all nonrevoked users in that interval. To accomplish this, we construct key chains skipping revoked users.
1) Key Assignment: Let be a pseudorandom sequence generator. For each , let be the -bit sequence from th bit to th bit of , and be the rightmost -bit sequence of . To assign one key to each interval in -, choose keys , randomly, to be given to , respectively. From each , construct skipping key chains for all possible intervals in -starting from . Let -be such an interval. Then the skipping key chain for is constructed inductively under the following rule:
• the chain starts from ; • for any nonrevoked user , if the next user is also nonrevoked, then just apply to the key of to obtain the key of ; • if the next users are revoked and the user is nonrevoked, then skip those revoked users and apply to the key of to obtain the key of , where . Fig. 4 illustrates how to construct the key chain of a given punctured interval (with , ): In the key chain for , the key of a nonrevoked user is denoted by , where and . When , we simply write . For example
The center assigns these keys to users so that the user receives his/her user-key consisting of all possible 's, bits. So the size of all 's is , which will be ignored when computing the transmission overhead because it is negligible compared to the size of all 's. 3) Decryption: Receiving the encrypted message, each nonrevoked user first locates the interval where he/she belongs using the info's in the header. Let the interval be -, where . Then can find as follows.
• Find for which , where . Here, or means that there is no revoked user before or after , respectively.
• Choose from the assigned user-key.
• Starting from , apply one-way permutation 's under the rule described in Key Assignment until the second subscript reaches to .
• The resulting key is then . With this, decrypts and to obtain the session-key and the message , respectively, in order.
C. Performance
In this section, we analyze efficiency-the transmission overhead, the computation cost and the storage size-of the skipping chain scheme -, where , and .
Let
. For convenience, we regard any nonempty interval consisting of less than consecutive nonrevoked users and one revoked user at the end also as a 1-punctured interval in -. In order to compute the transmission overhead in the worst case, we are going to introduce blocks. In general, a block of type is an interval starting from a nonrevoked user and ending with a nonrevoked user , containing exactly revoked users and being covered by subintervals in -. In a block, we do not allow revoked users between the neighboring subintervals in the block but allow at most one revoked user at the end. The main purpose to introduce the notion of blocks is to count the maximum number of and if and if disjoint subintervals in -necessary to cover all nonrevoked users as a function of , the number of revoked users given.
In any given session of the skipping chain scheme -, we can partition the set of all users into disjoint blocks of type and , and revoked users in between. The worst case transmission overhead is attained when each block is shortest of its type and there are no revoked users between blocks.
Except the last block, whose length may be smaller than the others of the same type, any block of type is of length at least , which is the length of the interval of the form , any block of type is of length at least , which is the length of a -punctured -interval, and finally any block of type is of length at least , which is the length of a -interval.
Let , and be the number of blocks of types , and , respectively. Then we obtain and where is the number of revoked users. To maximize TO, we need to reduce as small as possible. When , the worst case occurs when . In this case, we have and, therefore, we may put As a function of , the right-hand side (RHS) of the above inequality represents the line connecting and .
If
, cannot be zero. But we may assume in the worst case because , , and , when can be replaced by , , , while maintaining the same TO. Since , , and, therefore
The RHS of the above inequality is the line connecting and . It is trivial that the computation cost is at most computations of or , that is -which is independent of and .
Proposition 3:
The storage size of each user in the scheme -is -which is independent of and .
Proof:
We count the number of keys of the form for the user . Let denote the number of keys of the form with . It is obvious that . For , it suffices to count the number of keys from 1-skipping key chains of length , which is , the number of keys from 1-skipping key chains of length , which is , the number of keys from 1-skipping key chains of length 3, which is 1. That is Similarly, we obtain and in general Therefore, the storage size of the scheme -is -In other words, we have -.
This scheme can be fit in with various broadcast environments by adjusting the parameters , , and . If a user device has limited storage and computing power like smart cards and sensors, then we may set and as small as possible. If a user device allows a large key storage like set-top boxes and DVD players, then we may take and as large as possible to reduce the transmission overhead, which is much more expensive in some applications. For example, let , , and . Then for -This is good, but we have to pay the price: the storage size increases exponentially with . In the above example, it is about . User addition is also almost free in the skipping chain scheme. Finally, note that if , then we do not need the parameter and the scheme -becomes the -basic chain scheme.
IV. CASCADE CHAIN AND LAYERS
Although the skipping chain scheme performs marvellous (in terms of transmission overhead) when is not too small, the scheme has a shortcoming in that the transmission overhead is larger than that of SD when is very small. This is mainly because long intervals (of length bigger than ) consisting of only nonrevoked users require several intervals in -to cover them while covering no revoked users at all. In fact, the -basic chain scheme shares the same problem. In this section, we propose another scheme, called the cascade chain scheme, that resolves this problem by introducing layer structure and cascade key chains flowing along the layers. The cascade chain scheme is also based on -basic chain scheme and successfully reduces the transmission overhead when is very small.
A. Layers and Special Nodes
The key idea is to restrict the starting points or the ending points of long intervals to be special nodes (users) on top of the -basic chain scheme. 
B. Cascade Chain Scheme
In this section, we propose the cascade chain scheme with parameters and , denoted by -, based on the -basic chain scheme. The scheme reduces transmission overhead when is very small by adopting right and left cascade-keys which are the corresponding left and right cascade interval-keys, respectively.
1) Key Assignment:
In this scheme, the center assigns each user all possible right section-keys and left section-keys in addition to his/her user-key of the -basic chain scheme.
For . Therefore, each user eventually receives all the keys corresponding to all 's containing . These are the left section-keys. Altogether, each user is assigned at most keys. The detail is discussed in Section IV-C.
2) Encryption and Decryption: Encryption and decryption are basically the same as in the -basic chain scheme except that right and left cascade-keys are introduced. In each session, the disjoint intervals in -, which covers all nonrevoked users, are determined under the following rule:
• Starting from the leftmost nonrevoked user, find all disjoint intervals as in the basic scheme.
• To each such interval we apply the partitioning algorithm above to obtain at most two intervals in -. The center then encrypts the session-key for each interval obtained in this way. In encryption, the interval-keys, same as in the -basic chain scheme, are used for -intervals, while the cascade-keys are used for cascade intervals.
If user belongs to a -interval, then can decrypt the session key and the message as in the -basic chain scheme. 
C. Performance
In this section, we analyze efficiency-the transmission overhead, the computation cost and the storage size-of the cascade chain scheme with parameters and .
1) Transmission Overhead:
We can easily bound the transmission overhead by since each interval between two revoked users can be covered by at most two disjoint subintervals in -. But we can do better.
It is clear that in any given session of the cascade chain scheme -, we can partition the set of all users into disjoint blocks of types and , whose minimum lengths are 2 and , respectively, the last interval of the nonrevoked users possibly remained in the end, and revoked users in between. Here, is a block consisting of a subintervals in -and a revoked user following immediately, and is a block consisting of two subintervals in -and a revoked user following immediately. The minimum length of is attained by the block and the minimum length of is attained by the block consisting of a -interval followed by , where the first nonrevoked user of the block is not in and the last nonrevoked user of the block is not in . Because we are considering the worst case, we may assume that no revoked users are consecutive, that is, there are no revoked users between blocks. We may further assume that the first and the last users are nonrevoked.
Let and be the numbers of blocks of types and , respectively. Then we have and which implies . Hence, if , then . But this is an upper bound and the real TO should be . If , then . So we may put
The graph is piecewise linear and consists of two line segments. One is the line connecting and whose slope is close to 2, and the other is the line connecting and whose slope is close to 1. Consequently, TO is bounded by for all , and further by if .
2) Storage Size:
To compute the storage size of the cascade chain scheme is rather complicated. But we can do it by counting the right section-keys for each user.
Proposition 4:
Proof: Let , where . Then the user receives every right section-key assigned to the right sections At most right section-keys from th layer are assigned to the section . To , two kinds right section-keys are assigned: at most right section-keys cascading from th layer right section-keys and at most right section-keys from th layer. So, at most right section-keys are assigned to the section . In general, at most right section-keys are assigned to the section unless , in which case the maximum number of right section-keys assigned is . So altogether, right section-keys are assigned to . Since the same number of left section-keys are also assigned, we have the formula in the proposition, where is the number of -interval keys on the ground layer coming from the -basic chain scheme.
If we take , and (so , billion), then the storage size is mere . 
D. Remark
If we adopt left cascade key chains, then user addition is not easy because new left cascade keys from the newly added users should be assigned to the current users. However, if we use only right cascade key chains, then user addition as in the previous schemes is available. In this case, the storage overhead is reduced to and the computational cost remains the same. The transmission overhead also remains unchanged when , but it increases when . More precisely, the graph of the transmission overhead is piecewise linear passing through for and .
V. SKIPPING AND CASCADE COMBINED
In this section, we combine the skipping chain scheme and the cascade chain scheme. The skipping chain scheme reduces the transmission overhead remarkably when is not very small while the cascade chain scheme performs comparable to SD (in the transmission overhead) when is very small. Combining the two schemes, we reduce the transmission overhead even further down for very small .
A. Combined Chain Scheme
The combined chain scheme adopts punctured intervals and skipping chains on top of the cascade chain scheme. To be more precise, let , and be the parameters introduced in the skipping chain scheme as well as in the cascade chain scheme. For the combined chain scheme with these parameters, denoted by -, we enlarge -to
, one can make the number of disjoint subintervals in -, whose union covers all nonrevoked users, not bigger than that of disjoint subintervals in -, whose union also covers all nonrevoked users, in any given session. Thus, it is obvious that the transmission overhead of the combined chain scheme is less than or equal to that of the cascade chain scheme. In order to avoid unnecessary complication, we describe the scheme for only.
1) Partitioning Algorithm:
The partitioning algorithm of intervals in the combined chain scheme is basically the same as that in the cascade chain scheme. But additional steps are necessary to take care of punctured intervals. Note that punctured -intervals are included in -. This partitioning algorithm can cover a set of consecutive users including at most one revoked user with at most 4 subintervals in -. Starting from the leftmost nonrevoked user, we find two revoked users and . If or , partition according to the partitioning algorithm of the cascade scheme in Section III-C, respectively. If and , then we apply the following algorithm to to find the left most interval in -. Then we reset , , and , and repeat the process. In the following algorithm, we denote by and the first digits of and in their -ary representation, respectively.
• • Step 3: If , then take the equation shown at the bottom of the page as one partition. In the above algorithm, at each step, we take the interval in -of maximum possible length except for the following case:
and in which case we take instead of to use a right cascade interval next time.
Under this algorithm, it is clear that can partitioned into at most four subintervals.
2) Key Assignment: Each user is assigned all keys from key chains of three types: -basic chains, skipping chains of length at most and right/left cascade chains. Let be a pseudorandom sequence generator and denote for , where 's, 's and are -bit sequences. Letting , the key generation for the three types of key chains are exactly the same as described in Section II-C, Section III-B, and Section IV-B, respectively.
3) Encryption and Decryption: Encryption and decryption are basically the same as in the cascade chain scheme except that 1-punctured interval-keys are introduced. In each session, the disjoint intervals in -, which covers all nonrevoked users, are determined under the following rule:
• The first interval starts from the leftmost nonrevoked user and each of the following intervals start from the first nonrevoked user, say , after the previous interval.
• If the first revoked user after is followed by another revoked user , then partition into at most two subintervals in --.
• If the first revoked user after is followed by a nonrevoked user, then take the subinterval in -from as described in the above algorithm, where is the next revoked user after . Once the center determines these disjoint intervals, the rest of encryption and decryption process is just the combination of those of the cascade chain scheme and the skipping chain scheme.
B. Performance
In this section, we analyze efficiency-the transmission overhead, the computation cost and the storage size-of the combined chain scheme -, where . 1) Transmission Overhead: It is clear that the transmission overhead of the combined chain scheme is bounded above by , which is an upper bound of the transmission overhead of the cascade chain scheme, when . We prove that the transmission overhead reduces to roughly , to , and then eventually to as grows, which is an upper bound of the transmission overhead of the skipping chain scheme with . (For general , the transmission overhead reduces to as grows.) In order to prove this, we introduce several types of blocks. In the following, we regard, for convenience, any interval consisting of less than consecutive nonrevoked users and one revoked user at the end also as a 1-punctured interval and include such intervals in -as we did in . A block of type in the combined chain scheme -consists of intervals in -and possibly a revoked user at the end, containing revoked users altogether.
• : a block consisting of four intervals in -containing two revoked users.
• : a block consisting of three intervals in -containing two revoked users.
• : a block consisting of a 1-punctured interval in -or a nonpunctured interval in -followed by a revoked user.
• : a block consisting of a 1-punctured interval in -and another revoked user at the end.
if and if or otherwise
• : a block consisting of 4 intervals in -containing two revoked users and one more at the end.
• : a block consisting of three intervals in -containing two revoked users and one more at the end.
• : a block consisting of two intervals in -containing a revoked users and one more at the end. In any given session, we can partition the set of all users into disjoint blocks of the above types and possibly another block of type or in the end, together with those revoked users located between the blocks. Since our purpose is to compute the transmission overhead in the worst case, we may assume that there are no revoked users between the blocks. One may wonder why we allow , and to appear only in the end. The reason is simple. For example, the minimum length of is , which is attained by a -interval followed by . This yields the transmission overhead for . But this type of blocks cannot be neighbors as we can see later. So if we look at instead of two , then we can improve the bound of the transmission overhead because the minimum length of is , which is much longer than . In this way, we can prove that the transmission overhead is for and for . The disjoint blocks can be determined uniquely according the following algorithm:
• Step 1: Using the partitioning algorithm described in the previous section, find disjoint subintervals -whose union covers all nonrevoked users. Note that we enlarged -by inserting all those intervals each of which consists of less than consecutive nonrevoked users and one revoked user at the end. For each , we define by including the first revoked user immediately following, if exists.
• The minimum length of blocks is and this occurs when a of length is followed by a of length and then by a revoked user at the end. In other words, this is the case when a -interval is followed by , a long interval of length , and in order. The minimum lengths of blocks and blocks are and . They occur when a of length is followed by and a -interval followed by , respectively. Summarizing the above, we obtain Fig. 6 In most known schemes, it is better to give the decryption key for each nonrevoked user once the number of revoked users exceeds . However, in our scheme above, we can use the scheme until the number of revoked users reaches .
2) Storage Size and Computation Cost:
The storage size of the combined chain scheme is the sum of those of the skipping chain scheme and the cascade chain scheme, that is -The computation cost is the larger than those of the two schemes. Hence -which is in most cases since .
VI. SECURITY PROOF
As explained in Section II-A, to achieve the revocation-scheme security, it is enough to show that our key assignment scheme satisfies the key-indistinguishability: Let be an adversary that selects a subset of the set of all users and obtains for each .Wesaythekey-assignmentalgorithmiskey-indistinguishable if the probability that given old information of all users which are not in , distinguishes the subset-key of from a random key of similar length is negligible. First, we consider the skipping chain scheme. We assume that the function in the scheme is a pseudorandom sequence generator such that the probability that any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to distinguish an output of from a random string of similar length is negligible. Let be the where the probability is over the random coins of and the random choices of , . The adversary against the key-indistinguishability needs to distinguish for the subset-key of from a random key of similar length. Then there exists such that , , and . We denote by the value obtained by removing the leftmost th bits from for and for and . Note that all the keys that the adversary receives are information-theoretically independent from or can be computed from for . Then the advantage of is where the probability is over the random coins of and the random choices of , from . Now we estimate the advantage of . By the pseudorandomness of , we can see that where the probability is over the random coins of and over the random choices of , , from , , and , respectively. . By a hybrid argument, we have . In the combined scheme, we consider a pseudorandom generator with the distinguish probability . Since there are at most applications of one-way permutations, all the keys that receives are information-theoretically independent from or can be computed from at most subset-keys generated by from the same seed. By the hybrid argument similar to the skipping chain schemes, the advantage of is bounded by . The cascade chain scheme is similar except the output size of .
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our schemes with that of SD and discuss some practical issues.
A. Comparison
We present a comparison of our proposed schemes with the best known scheme-SD. Table I compares the transmission overheads in the worst case, the storage sizes and the computation costs of our schemes and SD when . We assume that every key in a user-key set is 128 bits. In each column, the minimum values are written in italic. From the table, we can see that the cascade chain scheme -and SD have the smallest TO when approaches to , and the skipping chain scheme -has the smallest TO when increases, where . However, the combined scheme -has the least TO all the time. Figs. 7 and 8 compare the transmission overheads of our schemes ( -skip), ( -skip), ( ) and ( -comb) with that of SD, in the worst case and the average case, respectively. Note that the data in the worst case are the theoretical upper bounds of TO. The data of the average case were obtained by simulating with randomly chosen revoked users. The small box in Fig. 7 is enlarged in Fig. 9 to compare TOs for small . The graph of -follows the graph of -for and the graph of -for while beats both for . Note that -is the best for . To make more precise comparison, we calculated more precise bound for the transmission overhead of SD scheme. We choose meaningful points with and compute bounds of the transmission overhead for chosen points. The result is when , for . 
B. Practical Remarks 1) User Addition:
The skipping chain scheme possesses an advantage that user addition is possible at any time almost free. In SD or LSD, once the system has launched and saturated, no user can be added without introducing a new tree. On the other hand, the skipping chain scheme -skip allows any number of user additions without changing the keys of the current users. To add one new user to the system, the center places him/her at the end of the line, computes the corresponding user-key and sends it to the new user. This process requires neither interaction nor key update of the current users. Note that the cascade chain scheme does not possess this property and hence the combined chain scheme does not, neither. Observe that, however, user addition is still feasible unless left cascade key chains are introduced.
2) User Replacement: User replacement is a much more complicated problem than user addition. User replacement is to remove revoked users permanently, and add new users at their positions. In general, user replacement is not possible without user-key update, which is not allowed in many schemes. When user-key update is allowed, the skipping chain scheme -skip performs user replacement at reasonably small cost: one user replacement requires user-key update of at most users. 3) Flexibility: Our schemes possess flexibility with system parameters and , which is a quite different feature from the tree based schemes. We can choose system parameters in such a way that the transmission overhead is very small or in another way that the storage size and the computation cost are very small. If the user device provides limited storage like smart cards for example, then we may use the -basic chain scheme with small which requires each user to store only keys. The computation cost is at most computations of one-way permutations. For example, if we take , then the storage size is only 20 keys for each user and the computation cost is 9.5 computations of one-way permutations on average (at most 19) while the transmission overhead is . In fact, our schemes without punctured intervals can fit in as good as any other schemes to key restriction, which was introduced in [4] . On the other hand, if the user device provides large storage like set-top boxes, PCs and CD or DVD players, and the transmission is expensive, then one can use -or -with large , in which the transmission overhead becomes less than as .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed broadcast encryption schemes based on the idea 'one key per each partition' after partitioning the users. They are the skipping chain scheme -skip , the cascade chain scheme -casc , and the combined chain scheme -comb . The scheme -skip has very small TO if is not very small. The scheme -casc has the same TO with the SD when is very small. Combining the two scheme, we achieved the smallest TO for all .
Moreover, our schemes may fit in to various broadcast environment by varying system parameters. That is, we can optimize the transmission overhead, the computation cost or the storage size by adjusting , and suitably.
